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This article explores whether people more frequently attempt to repair misunderstandings when
speaking to an artiﬁcial conversational agent if it is represented as fully human. Interactants in dyadic
conversations with an agent (the chat bot Cleverbot) spoke to either a text screen interface (agent's
responses shown on a screen) or a human body interface (agent's responses vocalized by a human speech
shadower via the echoborg method) and were either informed or not informed prior to interlocution that
their interlocutor's responses would be agent-generated. Results show that an interactant is less likely to
initiate repairs when an agent-interlocutor communicates via a text screen interface as well as when
they explicitly know their interlocutor's words to be agent-generated. That is to say, people demonstrate
the most “intersubjective effort” toward establishing common ground when they engage an agent under
the same social psychological conditions as face-to-face humanehuman interaction (i.e., when they both
encounter another human body and assume that they are speaking to an autonomously-communicating
person). This article's methodology presents a novel means of benchmarking intersubjectivity and
intersubjective effort in human-agent interaction.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).“Intersubjectivity has [… ] to be taken for granted in order to be
achieved.” e
Rommetveit (1974, p. 56)1. Introduction
Psychological research involving artiﬁcial agents designed to
emulate human social capabilities (e.g., robots, androids, and
conversational agents that interact using spoken language and/or
nonverbal behavior) has largely focused on whether people self-
report these agents to be humanlike. Arguably, however, what is
more important is whether such agents elicit humanlike patterns of
interaction. Cassell and Tartaro (2007) claim that “the goal ofhology, Queen's House, Lon-
C2A 2AE, United Kingdom.
Ltd. This is an open access article uhuman-agent interaction [… ] should not be a believable agent; it
should be a believable interaction between a human and agent in a
given context” (p. 407). Accordingly, it has been proposed that the
appropriate means of benchmarking an agent is to evaluate the
extent to which the agent and a human interactant can together
demonstrate a quality of intersubjectivity similar to that displayed
in humanehuman interaction (Cassell & Tartaro, 2007; Sch€onbrodt
& Asendorpf, 2011), herein referred to as “benchmark intersub-
jectivity.” Intersubjectivity is a term that refers to the interactional
relationship between perspectives within a dyad or larger group
that becomes evident through each interactant's behavioral
orientation to the other (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010; Linell, 2009;
Trevarthen & Aitken, 2001). Intersubjectivity is co-constructed
within social interaction (Jacoby & Ochs, 1995). When used as a
criterion for evaluating human-agent interaction (HAI), emphasis is
placed not on isolated characteristics of either party (e.g., how
humanlike the agent appears), but rather on the speciﬁc commu-
nicative processes through which the human-agent pair's per-
spectives are coordinated.
A key intersubjective process demonstrated by humans involvesnder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Aaron: How did you get to work today?
Bryan: I took the subway.
Aaron: You took the subway?
Bryan: Err, I mean I took the underground.
I forgot that that's what you call it here in London.
Aaron: Got it.
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(i.e., a shared understanding of the semantics and frames of refer-
ence particular to a given interaction) via a linguistic toolkit that
enables the diagnosing, signaling, and repair of misunderstandings
(Clark & Brennan, 1991; Schegloff, 1992). Merely possessing this
toolkit, however, is insufﬁcient for establishing common ground;
this accomplishment requires active facilitation by each party to an
interaction by-way-of regular and appropriate use of this toolkit
(Alterman, 2007; Clark & Schaefer, 1989). When a person facilitates
common ground at a level indicative of benchmark intersubjec-
tivity, the person can be said to be exerting “benchmark intersub-
jective effort.” With respect to HAI, exerting benchmark
intersubjective effort toward an agent is necessary otherwise the
interactant will deprive the agent of the communicative support
necessary to ascend into the complex intersubjective world of
humans.
The current article tests the idea that absent the belief that they
are engaging with an autonomously communicating person, hu-
man interactants will not exert benchmark intersubjective effort
when in communicationwith an artiﬁcial agent, nor will they exert
benchmark intersubjective effort if an agent communicates via a
nonhuman interface (i.e., does not have a human body). This idea is
explored via the “echoborg” method demonstrated by Corti and
Gillespie (2015a). An echoborg is a hybrid entity composed of a
human speech shadower who wears a concealed inner-ear audio
receiver and vocalizes words they receive from a conversational
agent. The technique enables social situations wherein people
believe they are speaking to an autonomously communicating
human (due to the fact that they engage with another human body
face-to-face and in person) when in reality the words spoken by
this human are entirely determined by an unseen agent. This
method can elicit an approximation of benchmark intersubjective
effort from interactants in a baseline condition (i.e., human body
interface þ no explicit knowledge of an interlocutor's words being
agent-determined) that can be compared to the intersubjective
effort demonstrated in conditions involving a nonhuman interface
and/or explicit knowledge that an interlocutor's words are agent-
generated.
2. Intersubjectivity and intersubjective effort
Intersubjectivity has been conceptualized as entailing the in-
teractions among (minimally) three levels of perspectives: (1)
direct-perspectives (each party's point-of-view), (2) meta-per-
spectives (what each party thinks the other party's point-of-view
is), and (3) meta-meta-perspectives (what each party thinks the
other party thinks their point-of-view is) (Gillespie & Cornish,
2010; Icheiser, 1943; Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966). According to
Gillespie and Cornish (2010), this framework can be used to un-
derstand social processes such as deception (i.e., the manipulation
of meta-perspectives) as well as operationalize disagreements (i.e.,
misalignments between self's direct-perspectives and other's
direct-perspectives) and misunderstandings (i.e., misalignments
between self's meta-perspectives and other's direct-perspectives).
This distinction between disagreement and misunderstanding is
crucial: achieving common ground is not about parties agreeing
with one another, but about parties forming accurate meta-
perspectives in relation to the context of an interaction, and this
is facilitated via empirically observable conversational processes
that display and repair perspectives (see Clark & Brennan, 1991;
Markova, 2003; Tirassa & Bosco, 2008).
Consider the following vignette, in which Aaron (from London)
and Bryan (from New York) have a conversation:Bryan formulates his initial response (“I took the subway”) on
the assumption that Aaron's meta-perspective with regard to the
semantics of the utterance will match his direct-perspective (i.e.,
Bryan “designs” his utterance based on expectations he holds
about Aaron; see Arundale, 2010; Gillespie & Cornish, 2014).
Aaron then signals to Bryan that, in fact, he does not understand
the semantics of Bryan's initial response (“You took the subway?”),
indicating that Aaron's meta-perspective of the phrase “I took the
subway” does not align with Bryan's direct-perspective of the
phrase. Bryan subsequently infers that Aaron is requesting an
update to his meta-perspective and responds by clarifying the
semantics of his initial response (“Err, I mean I took the under-
ground. I forgot that that's what you call it here in London”). As
evidenced by Aaron's ﬁnal utterance (“Got it”), Bryan's clariﬁca-
tion sufﬁciently resolves the misunderstanding. Aaron now un-
derstands what Bryan meant by the phrase “I took the subway” as
there is now alignment between Aaron's meta-perspective and
Bryan's direct-perspective.
The intersubjective effort exerted by both Aaron and Bryan in
pursuit of common ground is evidenced by the relationship be-
tween their various speech acts. Producing speech acts in support
of establishing common ground is a process known as
“grounding” (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Clark & Schaefer, 1987). At
any ﬁxed point in time prior to, during, and after a social inter-
action there exists a relationship between the various possible
direct-, meta-, and meta-meta-perspectives held by each inter-
actant. Behaviors arising from of intersubjective effort (e.g.,
grounding) cause these perspectives to act upon one another so as
to make evident to each interactant loci of agreement/disagree-
ment and understanding/misunderstanding, and it is through
such processes that the contents of perspectives are negotiated
and updated.2.1. Analyzing intersubjective effort in dialog via observing repair
activity
Conversation Analysis (CA) provides a basis for evaluating the
quality of intersubjectivity in dialog (Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). CA
arose out of the sociological tradition of “ethnomethodology”
developed by Garﬁnkel (1967) and seeks to interpret language
usage within the micro-context experienced by parties to an
interaction (i.e., “talk-in-interaction”) rather than in a context-free,
idealized form (Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Hutchby & Woofﬁtt,
2008). Originators of CA identiﬁed fundamental organizational el-
ements of talk-in-interaction, including how speakers allocate
turns at talk as well as manage errors and misunderstandings
(Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks,
1977), and CA has since proved useful in interactionist ap-
proaches to evaluating human-computer dialog (e.g., Brennan,
1991; Frohlich, Drew, & Monk, 1994; Raudaskoski, 1990; Zdenek,
2001). The current article focuses exclusively on the repair of
misunderstandings, the mechanisms of which tie most directly to
the operationalization of intersubjectivity and intersubjective effort
described herein.
Aaron: How did you get to work today?
Bryan: TS/ I took the subway.
Aaron: RI/ You took the subway?
Bryan: R/ Err, I mean I took the underground.
I forgot that that's what you
call it here in the U.K.
Aaron: Got it.
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duce utterances that are misunderstood. CA researchers refer
to such utterances as “trouble sources” (Schegloff, 1992).
Repair activity is a type of grounding interactants deploy in
order to mutually manage the presence of trouble sources and
consists of the speaker of the trouble source (“self”) and the
recipient of the trouble source (“other”) structuring their turns
at speech so as to produce common ground. Successful repair
sequences can take one of four general turn-taking forms
(Zahn, 1984): (1) self-initiated self-repair involves the speaker
of a trouble source both signaling and self-correcting a trouble
source; (2) other-initiated self-repair involves the speaker of a
trouble source self-correcting the trouble source following it
being signaled by an interlocutor; (3) self-initiated other-repair
involves an interlocutor correcting a trouble source following
it being signaled by the speaker of the trouble source; (4)
other-initiated other-repair involves an interlocutor both
signaling and correcting a trouble source following its pro-
duction by another speaker. These repair formats function as
“the self-righting mechanism[s] for the organization of lan-
guage use in social interaction” (Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 381),
and according to Sidnell (2010), play “a vital role in the
maintenance of intersubjectivity” (p. 111).
Nearly all repair initiations occur within a “limited space
around their self-declared trouble-source,” while “virtually all
repairs (i.e., solutions) occur within a very narrowly circum-
scribed space from their repair initiations” (Schegloff, 2000, p.
208, emphasis in original). There is a strong tendency for other-
initiations of repair to occur in the turn following the utterance
that contains the trouble source (the second position) and be
immediately followed by a self-repair (Schegloff, 2000), creating
a three-turn sequence known as “repair after next turn”: (1)
trouble source (self)/ (2) repair initiation (other)/ (3) repair
outcome (self). As the third position provides the speaker of a
trouble source an opportunity to resolve a misunderstanding in
the brief window of space opened by an other-initiation, repair
after next turn has been described as “the last structurally pro-
vided defense of intersubjectivity in conversation” (Schegloff,
1992, p. 1295).
In the terminology of Laing et al. (1966), three turns are the
minimal unit required to establish mutual understanding: the
ﬁrst turn presents a direct-perspective, the second turn conveys a
meta-perspective, and the third turn conﬁrms or corrects the
meta-perspective. Repair after next turn thus coordinates per-
spectives, providing an elemental three-turn stitch in the co-
created fabric of intersubjectivity.
Analysis of other-initiated self-repair can be further linked to
intersubjectivity by considering how its mechanics involve bilateral
joint attention, a prerequisite of complex intersubjectivity. When
engaged in joint activities involving shared intentionality (i.e., the
ability to understand joint activity not merely from multiple sub-
jective points-of-view, but also from a “bird's eye” point-of view
from where the perspectives of self and other are seen as inte-
grated; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005), humans
can through a repertoire of behaviors (e.g., speech acts) direct the
attention of other humans to aspects of their environment relevant
to shared goals (e.g., the goal of establishing common ground).
Kaplan and Hafner (2006) outline four skills that an actor (biolog-
ical or otherwise) must possess in order to accomplish bilateral
joint attention: (1) attention detection (i.e., the ability to track the
attention of others), (2) attention manipulation (i.e., the ability to
manipulate and inﬂuence the attention of other actors through
verbal and/or nonverbal gestures), (3) social coordination (i.e., the
ability to engage in coordinated interaction with others via tech-
niques such as turn-taking and role switching), and (4) intentionalunderstanding (i.e., the ability to understand the intentions of
others and interpret and predict others' behaviors as they relate to
goals).
Consider once again the following vignette (“TS,” “RI,” and “R”
indicate trouble source, repair initiation, and repair,
respectively):At work in this passage are each of the four requisite skills for
bilateral joint attention outlined by Kaplan and Hafner (2006),
thus the complexity of Aaron and Bryan's intersubjective rela-
tionship and the intersubjective effort exerted by both can be
observed. Bryan's ﬁrst-position utterance (“I took the subway”) is
misunderstood by Aaron. Aaron's misunderstanding is signaled in
the next turn in the form of a repair initiation (“You took the
subway?”) that functions as an attempt to focus Bryan's attention
on the previous utterance wherein lies the trouble source (atten-
tion manipulation). As a direct consequence of this repair initiation,
Bryan becomes aware of the fact that Aaron's attention is turned
backward toward a trouble source located in Bryan's ﬁrst-position
utterance (attention detection). Bryan infers that Aaron's intention
in uttering the repair initiation is to elicit a third-position repair
(intentional understanding), thus Bryan clariﬁes the trouble source
in his next turn. The entire repair sequence occurs within a formal
structure of turn-taking supported by both interlocutors (social
coordination).
Kaplan and Hafner's (2006) four requisite skills can be
segmented into behavioral and non-behavioral varieties. Attention
manipulation involves overtly producing a behavior intended to
inﬂuence the perspective of an interactant (e.g., uttering an other-
initiation), while social coordination encompasses synchronizing
one's behavior in accordance with that of an interlocutor in a
manner conducive for the communication of perspectives (e.g.,
turn-taking). Attention detection and intentional understanding,
meanwhile, are principally cognitive skills that do not necessarily
manifest in the form of observable motor or linguistic behaviors
(i.e., one can understand the intentions of another without pro-
ducing an associated behavior). Insofar as intersubjective effort is
operationalized as a behavioral indicator of a commitment to
shared understanding, evidence for it in dialog can be found in
observable actions such as other-initiations of repair. Failing to
manipulate the attention of an interlocutor so as to alert them to
the presence of a misunderstanding when one otherwise could
constitutes a lack of intersubjective effort. For instance, had Aaron
for whatever reason not uttered a repair initiation despite misun-
derstanding Bryan's use of the word “subway,” then Bryan would
have failed to recognize that his direct-perspective and Aaron's
meta-perspective of the word “subway” were incongruent and the
two interlocutors would thereby have failed to establish common
ground.2.2. Intersubjectivity in human-agent dialog: the role of interfaces
and agency framing
Why might an interactant fail to exert benchmark intersubjec-
tive effort when in communication with an agent when they
K. Corti, A. Gillespie / Computers in Human Behavior 58 (2016) 431e442434otherwise could? Answering this question requires considering
how the agent is represented in the mind of the interactant. Spe-
ciﬁcally, it requires considering the factors that inﬂuence how the
interactant generates meta-perspectives of the agent's direct-
perspectives and how these perspectives are interacted with (if at
all). This article examines two such factors: (1) the nature of the
agent's means of interfacing (i.e., its embodied means of partici-
pating in social communication), and (2) the framing of the agent's
communicative agency (namely, whether or not the interactant
holds the belief that they are talking to an agent as opposed to
another human being).
First, consider the role of interfaces in fostering intersubjec-
tivity. The sense that an interlocutor possesses attention that can
be manipulated so as to jointly manage misunderstandings pro-
vides to an interactant the impetus for intersubjective effort, and
attributing attention to a potential interlocutor involves the sup-
position that said interlocutor has a subjective perspective of a
shared social world (see Graziano, 2013). Detection of the sub-
jective perspectives possibly held by another interlocutor involves
inferring information signaled via the interlocutor's interface (e.g.,
its physical body), therefore the properties of an interlocutor's
means of interfacing inﬂuence how an interactant perceives and
orients to the interlocutor's perspectives (be they real or
imagined).
That an interface can exert such a powerful inﬂuence over
intersubjectivity has long been of interest to psychologists and
philosophers concerned with the embodied nature of perspective-
taking (e.g., on this topic, the phenomenologist Husserl invoked the
concept of “analogical apperception” e reﬂexively apperceiving
other people's subjectivity based on their appearing to be similarly
embodied and thereby becoming an “Other”; Husserl, 1931; also
see De Preester, 2008; Hemberg, 2006). The connection between
interfaces and the intersubjective relationship between two or
more parties has been triangulated upon by numerous empirical
research streams connected to social robotics and HAI. For example,
in a neuroimaging study that involved humans interacting with a
spectrum of entities ranging from extremely non-humanlike
computers to humanlike androids to actual humans, Krach et al.
(2008) demonstrated that “the tendency to build a model of an-
other's mind linearly increases with its perceived human-likeness”
(p. 1). Riek, Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, and Robinson (2009),
meanwhile, found that people self-report greater empathy for ro-
bots perceived to be humanlike than for non-humanlike robots.
Furthermore, Saygin and Stadler (2012) showed that people are
more accurate when processing and predicting the motor behavior
of humanlike agents compared to non-humanlike agents, sug-
gesting that the degree to which the motor activity of an agent
“resonates” with a human observer corresponds with how hu-
manlike the agent is perceived to be. These ﬁndings suggest that as
an agent's means of interfacing becomes more humanlike, the de-
gree to which interactants consciously and unconsciously form
models of the agent's perspectives and attention increases (this is
often referred to as “mentalizing,” or demonstrating “theory of
mind”). This also implies that the more an interactant's awareness
of an agent's perspectives is reduced as a result of the agent's
particular means of interfacing, so to will be the interactant's
impetus for exerting benchmark intersubjective effort.
The notion that artiﬁcial agents with humanlike means of
interfacing provide for more intersubjectively rich interactions has
inspired the development of both embodied conversational inter-
face agents (sometimes referred to simply as embodied agents, or
intelligent virtual agents) and androids. Embodied agents are
conversational agents that have been combined with anthropo-
morphic onscreen or immersive virtual interfaces. Many can
respond to both verbal and non-verbal input, generate verbal andnon-verbal output, engage in repairs of misunderstanding, and
communicate about the communication they engage in (Bailenson
& Yee, 2005; Cassell, 2000). Androids, meanwhile, are physical
machine imitations of humans. The ﬁeld of android science has
used such machines to better understand principles of human
psychology being that the similarities in morphology between
androids and humans allow researchers to investigate whether
people respond in an alike manner when interacting with human
and humanlike stimuli (Ishiguro & Nishio, 2007; MacDorman &
Ishiguro, 2006). Android science has shown that while humans
do demand more sociality from actual humans than from androids,
people expect more sociality from androids than from mechanical
looking robots and lesser-looking agents (MacDorman, 2006). The
echoborg was introduced to the ﬁeld of android science by Corti
and Gillespie (2015a) in order to leapfrog current bottlenecks
concerning the imperfect appearance and motor behaviors of
contemporary androids as an echoborg approximates an android
that can “pass” as human in terms of physical appearance and
motor behavior.
An interactant's mental formulation of the potential perspec-
tives held by an interlocutor is not solely a function of the in-
terlocutor's means of interfacing, however. In fact, the meta-
perspectives of an interlocutor's direct-perspectives held by an
interactant can be manipulated simply by altering the interactant's
beliefs about the interlocutor. Indeed, many experiments that
assess the degree towhich people engagewith the real or imagined
perspectives of other entities involve varying the ways in which an
entity's communicative agency is framed. In HAI research this often
entails either priming research participants to believe that they are
engaging a fully-autonomous agent when in reality the agent is
human-controlled (an approach referred to as the “Wizard of Oz”
technique; Dahlb€ack, J€onsson, & Ahrenberg, 1993) or priming them
to believe that they are engaging a real person when they are in
reality interacting with an agent. Studies have shown that people
mentalize less about an entity when they believe the entity to be
controlled by an artiﬁcial agent rather than an actual person
(Chaminade et al., 2012; Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002;
Kircher et al., 2009; also see Branigan, Pickering, Pearson,
McLean, & Brown, 2011). Kennedy, Wilkes, Elder, and Murray
(1988) found that in the context of text-based human-agent
dialog, the primed belief that an agent-interlocutor was actually a
real person led to an increase in interactants' use of anaphors
(words that point back to earlier parts of a conversation), implying
that people less often attempt to direct an interlocutor's attention
backward toward prior utterances when they believe the inter-
locutor to be a nonhuman agent. These ﬁndings suggest that
intersubjective effort can potentially be impacted by the mere
belief that one is or isn't interacting with another human being.
While with traditional HAI methods researchers can prime the
belief that an agent is really a human, this approach is only possible
when used in conjunction with a nonhuman interface (i.e., a
researcher cannot convince a research participant that a robot is
actually an autonomous human being, they can only prime the
belief that the robot is controlled by a real person, be that true or
false in reality). Although embodied agents and androids mimic
human likeness in a manner that augments the complexity of
intersubjectivity expected by interactants, these interfaces are not
fully human, therefore they do not evoke the full spectrum of
intersubjective expectations that color true humanehuman inter-
action (MacDorman, 2006). HAI research, therefore, has never to-
date investigated HAI within a fully humanehuman social psy-
chological frame wherein both the means of interfacing is fully
human and the implied communicative agency of the agent-
interlocutor is fully human. Since the echoborg method of HAI
can achieve this, it presents a way to investigate the intersubjective
K. Corti, A. Gillespie / Computers in Human Behavior 58 (2016) 431e442 435processes that occur between an interactant and an artiﬁcial agent
when the interactant both believes they are speaking to an
autonomous human being and encounters a truly human interface
(Corti & Gillespie, 2015a).3. Experimental study
3.1. Overview
The following study assessed instances of other-initiated self-
repair in dyadic conversations between research participants (in-
teractants) and the artiﬁcial conversational agent Cleverbot, a text-
based chat bot developed by Carpenter (2015). The study explored
whether interactant conversational repair behavior changes
depending on whether an agent-interlocutor communicates
through an actual human body (as opposed to a text screen inter-
face) and whether the interactant explicitly knows their interloc-
utor to be communicating the words of an agent. A 2  2
experimental design was utilized with the factors Screen (1: Clev-
erbot communicated with the interactant via text on a computer
screen; 0: Cleverbot communicated with the interactant via a hu-
man speech shadower - an echoborg) and Aware (1: the interactant
was informed before the interaction that their interlocutor's words
would be those of a chat bot; 0: the interactant was not informed
before the interaction that their interlocutor's words would be
those of a chat bot). The study was approved by an ethics review
panel at a major British university and conducted in a behavioral
research laboratory.3.2. Hypotheses
The study tested four hypotheses predicting main effects of the
factors Screen and Aware on two separate dependent measures
related to interactant intersubjective effort: (1) other-initiations
produced by the interactant in response to Cleverbot utterances,
and (2) interactant self-repair attempts made in response to other-
initiations produced by Cleverbot. These hypotheses were devel-
oped based on the argument that interactant intersubjective effort
would be greatest in the “covert echoborg” baseline condition that
featured Cleverbot interacting through a human speech shadower
and the interactant not being informed that their interlocutor's
words would be determined by an artiﬁcial agent. It was predicted
that interactants would be less likely to produce other-initiations
following Cleverbot utterances when speaking via a text screen
interface (Hypothesis 1) and when explicitly aware that their in-
terlocutor's words were determined by a conversational agent
(Hypothesis 2). Likewise, it was predicted that interactants would
be less likely to produce self-repair attempts following Cleverbot
other-initiations when speaking via a text screen interface (Hy-
pothesis 3) and when explicitly aware that their interlocutor's
words were determined by a conversational agent (Hypothesis 4).3.3. Participants (interactants) and shadower
In total, 108 adults (69 female; mean age ¼ 25.87, SD ¼ 8.35)
participated in the study and were randomly assigned to experi-
mental conditions. These interactants were recruited online via a
university research participant recruitment portal and consisted of
London-based university students, university employees, and
adults unafﬁliated with the university. A female graduate student
(aged 30) functioned as the speech shadower in the two conditions
that involved interactants engaging a human interface.3.4. Procedure and apparatus
Following informed consent, the interactant was taken to an
interaction room where they were instructed by the researcher as
to how the study would proceed. The interactant sat in a chair at
one end of the room and was told that the study involved speaking
to an interlocutor for 10-min. The interactant was informed that
they could decide for themselves topics to discuss with their con-
versation partner so long as nothing was vulgar. The non-scripted
nature of the interaction was emphasized in order to allay any
suspicions that the interlocutor would be speaking rehearsed re-
sponses. The procedures for the separate experimental conditions
were as follows:
“Covert echoborg” scenario: (Aware ¼ 0, Screen ¼ 0). The
interactant was informed that the interlocutor (the female
speech shadower) would enter the interaction room and sit in a
chair facing the interactant shortly after the researcher exited
the room, and that the interlocutor would initiate the conver-
sation. Although the interlocutor would be shadowing words
generated by Cleverbot in response to things the interactant
said, this fact was not made known to the interactant at any
point prior to or during the interaction, and the researcher made
no allusion to conversational agents or chat bots prior to the
interaction commencing.
“Overt echoborg” scenario: (Aware ¼ 1, Screen ¼ 0). As with
the covert echoborg scenario, the interactant was informed that
their interlocutor would enter the interaction room and initiate
a conversation shortly after the researcher exited. Prior to
exiting, however, the researcher informed the interactant that
this interlocutor would be wearing an inner-ear device and
would speak aloud words they received from a chat bot com-
puter program located in an adjacent room. It was made clear to
the interactant that the speech shadower would not speak any
of their own thoughts during the interaction and that only the
chat bot would respond to words the interactant spoke.
“Covert text bot” scenario: (Aware ¼ 0, Screen ¼ 1). The
interactant sat facing a computer monitor on which a blank
instant messaging client (Pidgin) dialog box was displayed. The
interactant was informed that though they would speak aloud
to their interlocutor, their interlocutor would respond via text
that would appear on the monitor. As with the covert echoborg
scenario, the interactant was not informed that their in-
terlocutor's words would be determined by a chat bot and no
allusion to conversational agents or chat bots was made by the
researcher. The interactant was informed that their interlocutor
would initiate the conversation shortly after the researcher left
the room.
“Overt text bot” scenario: (Aware¼ 1, Screen¼ 1). As with the
covert text bot scenario, the interactant sat facing a computer
monitor onwhich a dialog box appeared andwas instructed that
though they would speak aloud to their interlocutor, their
interlocutor would respond via text readable on the monitor. As
with the overt echoborg scenario, the interactant was told that
their interlocutor's words would be those of a chat bot and that
the interlocutor would initiate the conversation shortly after the
researcher left the room.
The experimental apparatus was identical to that described by
Corti and Gillespie (2015a) in their demonstration of minimal
technological dependency interactant4 chat bot audio relay (for a
video demonstration, see Corti & Gillespie, 2015c). From a room
adjacent to the interaction room, the researcher listened to the
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interactant and speed typed the interactant's words into the Clev-
erbot program. In conditions involving the interactant engaging an
echoborg (Screen ¼ 0), the researcher spoke Cleverbot's responses
into a microphone which relayed to a discreet inner-ear monitor
worn by the shadower, whereas in conditions involving the inter-
actant engaging a computer interface (Screen ¼ 1), the researcher
relayed Cleverbot's responses to the interactant's computer
monitor via the Pidgin instant messaging client. In their use of a
minimal technological dependency interactant4 Cleverbot audio
relay scenario, Corti and Gillespie (2015a) report an average latency
(the time between the conclusion of an interactant utterance the
production of a Cleverbot response) of 5.15 s. In all conditions, the
researcher relayed the phrase “hi there” to the shadower/screen to
initiate the conversation. In order to establish identity consistency
between trials, several stock responses were used in lieu of Clev-
erbot's actual response to certain interactant utterances. When
interactants inquired as to where their interlocutor was from, the
stock response “I'm from London” was provided. If the interactant
inquired as to their interlocutor's occupation, the stock response
“I'm a student here” was used, and if the interactant asked what
their interlocutor studied, the stock response “psychology” was
used. Finally, if the interactant asked their interlocutor what their
name was, the stock response “Kim” was provided. The shadower
was instructed tomaintain a consistent nonverbal demeanor across
trials that reﬂected the spirit of the words generated by Cleverbot
and to maintain eye-contact with the interactant during vocal
delivery.
3.5. Measures: coding and quantifying intersubjective effort
Following the conclusion of all experimental trials, transcripts of
the interactions were prepared based on Cleverbot's input/output
logs. Transcripts were each assigned a random identiﬁcation
number so that they could be coded without coders knowing the
experimental condition to which a transcript belonged.
Testing each hypothesis required quantifying instances of other-
initiated self-repair activity evident in each experimental trial.
Researchers who use CA rarely quantify the phenomena they study
for the purpose of experimental statistical analysis, however
Schegloff (1993) does offer guidance on how one might proceed
with such an undertaking. A key to quantifying within the spirit of
CA is properly identifying “environments of relevant possible
occurrence” (Schegloff, 1993, p. 103), these being the locations
within dialog where certain speech acts are likely to be located. In
the case of repair initiations, such environments are clearly deﬁned
given that any utterance can act as a potential trouble source (ten
Have, 1999); other-initiations of repair, thus, “can in principle
occur after any turn at talk” (Schegloff, 1993, p. 115, emphasis in
original). Environments of relevant possible occurrence are like-
wise well-deﬁned for instances of third-position self-repair out-
comes as they occur in the turn following other-initiation. It is
important to note that while any turn at talk can potentially act as a
trouble source, trouble sources themselves cannot be identiﬁed in
isolation (i.e., they cannot be identiﬁed unless they are followed by
a repair initiation). Trouble sources, thus, are “launched” from the
second-position (Schegloff, 2007).
Criteria articulated by Schegloff et al. (1977) and Sidnell (2010)
were used to establish what instances of talk counted as other-
initiations of repair. Other-initiations can involve the use of ques-
tion words (e.g., Huh? What? Who?Where?When?), partial repeats
of the trouble source (e.g., The subway?), and full repeats of the
trouble source (e.g., You took the subway?) alone or in combination
with one another, as well as demonstrations of possible under-
standing (e.g., You took the subway … the walkway beneath thestreet?). Other-initiations can be and often are explicit in declaring
the presence of a misunderstanding (e.g., I don't understand; I don't
get what you just said; I'm not following you). Repair initiations that
treat the whole prior turn as a trouble source rather than reference
a particular element within the prior turn are known as “open”
class repair initiators (Drew, 1997). These often take the form of
single-word utterances (e.g., Pardon?). In some instances, other-
initiations are triggered by mishearing words spoken by an inter-
locutor (Schegloff et al. 1977; Zahn,1984) and involve a request that
the ﬁrst-position speaker repeat a trouble source (e.g., I'm sorry I
didn't hear what you just said). However, since half of the experi-
mental conditions involved participants reading text rather than
being spoken to audibly, instances of other-initiation that could be
linked to problems of hearing were excluded from analysis.
Third-position interactant utterances (those following a Clev-
erbot other-initiation) were classiﬁed as either legitimate attempts
at self-repair (i.e., utterances that acknowledged and attempted to
clarify a trouble source) or as non-repairs (i.e., utterances that did
not attempt to clarify a trouble source) on the basis of criteria
gleaned from Schegloff et al. (1977) as well as Schegloff (1997).
Repairs are usually “successful and quick” (Schegloff et al., 1977, p.
364). Successful third-position self-repairs often involve the
speaker of a trouble source repairing the trouble source via
rephrasing or elaboration. Generally, a logical relationship between
the third-position utterance and the trouble source is overt in in-
stances of self-repair (e.g., Err, I mean I took the underground), while
this relationship is often absent or ambiguous in instances of non-
repair. Non-repair can take the form of overt repair abandonment
(e.g., Just forget it) or the production of a non sequitur. Oftentimes a
non-repair can be identiﬁed where the third-position utterance
leads to a subsequent other-initiation, creating a connected chain
(or “cascade”) of unresolved repair attempts.
On the basis of these criteria, the following classiﬁcation codes
were assigned to each turn-at-talk for each transcript: Repair
Initiation (other-initiation), Repair (attempted self-repair following
other-initiation), Non-Repair (no valid self-repair attempt made
following other-initiation), and Null (turn-at-talk did not meet
criteria for any other code).
4. Results
A second coder with experience performing conversation
analysis coded a random subset of the transcripts (four transcripts
from each condition) in order to establish interrater reliability. High
consistency was found among raters, Cohen's Kappa ¼ 0.81,
p < 0.001, 95% CI ¼ [0.76, 0.86].
4.1. Interactant other-initiation behavior
A multilevel logistic regression model was used to test Hy-
pothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, with each observation being a turn-at-
talk taken by Cleverbot. The dependent measure was a binary
variable that took the value of 1 if the turn-at-talk was followed by
an interactant other-initiation, ﬁxed factors were Screen and Aware,
and random intercepts were conditioned on each experimental
dyad (i.e., each unique trial). This model showed a signiﬁcant main
effect of Screen, b ¼ 0.38, SE ¼ 0.18, p < 0.05, odds ratio
(OR) ¼ 0.68, 95% CI OR ¼ [0.48, 0.97], supporting Hypothesis 1:
engaging a text interface resulted in a 32% reduction in the odds
that an interactant would respond to a turn-at-talk taken by
Cleverbot with an other-initiation, all else being equal. The model
also showed a signiﬁcant main effect of Aware, b¼0.52, SE¼ 0.19,
p < 0.01, OR ¼ 0.59, 95% CI OR ¼ [0.41, 0.86], supporting Hypothesis
2: explicitly knowing that their interlocutor's words were deter-
mined by an agent resulted in a 41% reduction in the odds that an
Excerpt 3
(Covert text bot scenario, trial 16):
Cleverbot: Who are you married to?
Interactant: My wife.
Cleverbot: TS/ Who is your wife?
Interactant: RI/ Do you want her name?
Cleverbot: R/ Yes.
Interactant: Eleanor.
Excerpt 4
(Covert echoborg scenario, trial 29):
Interactant: Well, I do have exams coming up.
Cleverbot: TS/ Really? How do they work?
Interactant: RI/ Exams?
Cleverbot: R/ Yes, they are very stupid.
Interactant: You go into a room, you do whatever the paper says.
Excerpt 5
(Overt text bot scenario, trial 13):
Cleverbot: No, you're talking about Hamlet script.
Interactant: TS/ I'm not familiar with Hamlet
actually. I'm talking about Nirvana.
Cleverbot: RI/ I don't know anyone named
Nonsense, so I don't know what you're talking about.
Interactant: R/ Nirvana.
Cleverbot: I love Nirvana!
Excerpt 6
(Overt echoborg scenario, trial 1):
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an other-initiation, all else being equal. No signiﬁcant interaction
was found between Screen and Aware, b ¼ 0.24, SE ¼ 0.28, p ¼ 0.39.
The model included 3612 observations nested within 108 dyad
groups, AIC ¼ 3083, BIC ¼ 3114, random effect variance ¼ 0.24.
4.2. Interactant self-repair behavior
A logistic regression model was used to test Hypothesis 3 and
Hypothesis 4, with observations being each other-initiation pro-
duced by Cleverbot. The dependent measure was a binary variable
that took the value of 1 if the other-initiation was followed by the
interactant attempting to repair the trouble source. This model
showed neither a signiﬁcant main effect for Screen, b ¼ 0.54,
SE ¼ 0.54, p ¼ 0.32 (disconﬁrming Hypothesis 3), nor Aware,
b ¼ 0.42, SE ¼ 0.60, p ¼ 0.48 (disconﬁrming Hypothesis 4), nor
was there a signiﬁcant interaction between these factors, b ¼ 0.70,
SE ¼ 0.87, p ¼ 0.42. The speciﬁcation of random effects conditioned
on each experimental dyad did not improve model ﬁt. Though both
hypotheses were disconﬁrmed on the basis of the model showing
no statistically signiﬁcant effects of the ﬁxed factors, legitimate
attempts at self-repair following Cleverbot other-initiations were,
on average, the most likely in the baseline condition (covert
echoborg). The model included 210 total observations. Eighteen
dyad groups were excluded from analysis on the basis of their
containing no Cleverbot-uttered other-initiations.
4.3. A closer look at the co-construction of intersubjectivity
4.3.1. Bot self-repairs (or the lack thereof) vs interactant self-repairs
On average, Cleverbot successfully repaired only 22.27%
(SD ¼ 27.14%) of self-uttered trouble sources following interactant
other-initiation. Below are two examples of third-position non-
repair by Cleverbot (“NR” indicates a non-repair):Excerpt 1
(Covert echoborg scenario, trial 15):
Interactant: It doesn't matter what age you are.
Cleverbot: TS/ Yes it does my life makes sense.
Interactant: RI/ To age?
Cleverbot: NR/ Do you have a father?
Interactant: Ya, I do. Do you have siblings?
Excerpt 2
(Overt text bot scenario, trial 17):
Interactant: Do you have any siblings?
Cleverbot: Yes.
Interactant: How many?
Cleverbot: TS/ You left-handed, under-handed mess of wires and
batteries.
Interactant: RI/ What?
Cleverbot: NR/ Never mind.
Interactant: Can you ask me a question?
Cleverbot: Knock knock knockin’ on heaven's door!
Interactant: TS/ You like that music?
Cleverbot: RI/ Like what?
Interactant: R/ Do you like the music knockin on heaven's door?
Cleverbot: Yes.
Excerpt 7
(Overt echoborg scenario, trial 2):
Interactant: So what's your family life like?
Cleverbot: I don't have one.
Interactant: TS/ That might explain quite a bit then.
Cleverbot: RI/ Might?
Interactant: NR/ So are you running away from something by being
a student in London?
Excerpt 8
(Covert text bot scenario, trial 1):
Cleverbot: Hello.
Interactant: TS/ Good morning.
Cleverbot: RI/ Is it morning where you are?
Interactant: NR/ How are you?Excerpt 1 is an example a common type of Cleverbot non-repair
observed in the dataset, that of Cleverbot producing a non sequitur
following other-initiation rather than address the trouble source.
The non-repair in Excerpt 2, on the other hand, is a clear example of
self-repair abandonment, as Cleverbot simply utters “Never mind”
rather than attempt to repair the trouble source ﬂagged by the
interactant.
The legitimate attempts at self-repair Cleverbot did produce
often took the form of yes/no clariﬁcation, this form of repair
requiring less explicit elaboration of and engagementwith a trouble
source. Two examples of this type of repair are shown below:While Cleverbot only managed to produce legitimate attempts
at self-repair in response to roughly a quarter of the other-
initiations produced by interactants, interactants themselves
managed a rate of 84.36% (SD ¼ 30.65%) on average. Below are two
examples of self-repair attempts made by interactants:As with Excerpt 5 and Excerpt 6, legitimate interactant self-
repairs attempts often came in the form of elaborations or clariﬁ-
cations of the trouble source. Interactant non-repairs, meanwhile,
typically involved the production of a non sequitur that initiated
a new conversational trajectory, as shown in Excerpt 7 and
Excerpt 8:
Excerpt 11
(Covert echoborg scenario, trial 24):
Cleverbot: TS/ Because they are birds.
Interactant: RI/ I'm sorry?
Cleverbot: TS/ Don't be.
Interactant: RI/ Excuse me? Don't be what?
Cleverbot: TS/ You may be excused.
Interactant: RI/ From this?
Cleverbot: TS/ From this moment what?
Interactant: RI/ What do you mean by that?
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As the evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2
showed, interactants in the covert echoborg scenarioworked harder
to achieve common ground as they more frequently attempted to
elicit repairs from their interlocutor in relation to interactants in
other experimental conditions. This suggests that interactants in
non-baseline conditionsmore frequently “passed” on opportunities
to initiate repairs where a repair might have been warranted.
Consider the following excerpts (“NS” and “P” indicate non sequitur
and pass, respectively):Excerpt 9
(Covert text bot scenario, trial 10):
Cleverbot: I think you're interesting too.
Interactant: Thank you.
Cleverbot: You're welcome.
Interactant: What do you think of the recent London tube strike?
Cleverbot: NS/ Just a celestial being with the abilities to use divine
intervention but does not use it for the danger
or oblivion.
Interactant: P/ Fair enough.
Excerpt 10
(Overt echoborg scenario, trial 20):
Cleverbot: What book should I read?
Interactant: Well, I don't know. I don't know what kind of
literature you like.
Cleverbot: Why don't you know?
Interactant: Well, it's just because I don't know you.
Cleverbot: NS/ I don't speak German, but my
grandfather is German.
Interactant: P/ Okay cool. Well then you…
would you like to read a book with me?
Excerpt 12
(Covert text bot scenario, trial 17):
Interactant: What's your favorite game?
Cleverbot: TS/ He is a legend.
Interactant: RI/ He is a legend? Is it a game?
Cleverbot: TS/ Yes you are.
Interactant: RI/ I'm a game?
Cleverbot: NR/ I'm a cat.
Excerpt 13
(Overt text bot scenario, trial 16):
Interactant: Hello, how are you?
Cleverbot: TS/ No, that was wrong!
Interactant: RI/ Why?
Cleverbot: NR/ I want to eat a cookie.
Interactant: C/ You can eat it if you want, but give me one as well.
Excerpt 14
(Covert echoborg scenario, trial 3):
Cleverbot: Why are they not funny?
Interactant: Some of them are, some of
them are funny. Unintentionally funny.
Cleverbot: TS/ No they're a soccer club.In the excerpts shown above, the interactants choose not to
initiate repairs following clear non sequiturs uttered by Cleverbot.
In Excerpt 9 the interactant appears indifferent to Cleverbot's non
sequitur and responds with an apathetic statement (“Fair enough”).
A somewhat different approach is taken by the interactant in
Excerpt 10; rather than initiate a repair of Cleverbot's non sequitur,
the interactant attempts to steer the conversational trajectory back
toward the topic that the interlocutors had been discussing prior to
the non sequitur.Interactant: RI/ What?
Cleverbot: NR/ What is it like to be a human?
Interactant: C/ It's weird. It's not that great.4.3.3. Handling non-repair
Interactants dealt with Cleverbot non-repair by producing one
of three general response-types: (1) successive other-initiations, (2)
continuations, and (3) departures.
Successive other-initiations were instances where an interac-
tant requested that Cleverbot repair either the non-repair located
in the previous turn (as in Excerpt 11, below) or the original trouble
source (as in Excerpt 12, below), creating a connected series of
adjacency pairs featuring repair initiation (a “repair initiation
cascade”):Continuations, meanwhile, encompassed engaging with the
content of a non-repair without requesting that it or the original
trouble source actually be repaired (i.e., the non-repair is not
treated as problematic). This activity is analogous to that which has
been described by CA researchers who investigate interactions
involving one or more persons with hearing loss or aphasia,
wherein recipients of a third-position non-repair caused by a
trouble source speaker's inability to perceive the second turn other-
initiation will often choose to let the trouble pass without exerting
further effort to establish understanding (Caissie & Gibson, 1997;
Goodwin, 2003; Skelt, 2012). In these situations, repair is fully
abandoned, as shown in Excerpt 13 and Excerpt 14 below (“C” in-
dicates a continuation):Finally, departures encompassed interactant reactions to Clev-
erbot non-repair that neither sought to repair any preceding talk
nor engaged with the content introduced by the non-repair. De-
partures featured regularly in the current study as interactants
frequently responded to Cleverbot non-repairs by simply initiating
a new conversational trajectory, as demonstrated in the following
excerpts (“D” indicates a departure):
Excerpt 15
(Overt echoborg scenario, trial 12):
Cleverbot: TS/ So I tell him hello.
Interactant: RI/ Who have you told hello?
Cleverbot: NR/ Because you just asked.
Interactant: RI/ A friend of yours?
Cleverbot: NR/ Lol, not right. Try again.
Interactant: D/ I'm thinking of going on a big trip this year.
Do you have any suggestions for a vacation?
Excerpt 16
(Covert text bot scenario, trial 16):
Interactant: Do you come here often?
Cleverbot: TS/ Today is a little awkward initially.
Interactant: RI/ I don't understand.
Cleverbot: NR/ Me too.
Interactant: D/ What's your favorite ﬁlm?
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compared in terms of interactants' responses to Cleverbot non-
repairs. Although no speciﬁc hypotheses were made prior to the
experiment regarding how interactants’ reactions to non-repair
might differ between conditions, the observation that the covert
echoborg scenario (the baseline condition) saw the highest relative
percentage of successive repair initiations (29.14%, on average)
while the overt text bot scenario saw the lowest relative percentage
(22.71%, on average) supports the prediction that intersubjective
effort will be greater when interactants assume that they are
interacting with an autonomous human vs. when they know they
are communicatingwith an artiﬁcial agent. Lending further support
to this overarching prediction is the fact that departures were most
common in the overt text bot scenario. In all conditions, in-
teractants responded to Cleverbot non-repairs with continuations
over 50% of the time, on average.Table 1
Interactant responses to interlocutor non-repair.
Average relative percentage of response-type
Response-type Echoborg scenario Text bot scenario
Covert Overt Covert Overt
Successive other-initiation 29.14% 26.19% 27.68% 22.72%
Continuation 52.29% 55.95% 62.22% 53.66%
Departure 18.57% 17.86% 10.10% 23.62%
Note. Trials: covert echoborg (n ¼ 29), overt echoborg (n ¼ 25), covert text bot
(n ¼ 29), overt text bot (n ¼ 25).5. General discussion
In an experimental study that made use of the echoborgmethod
of HAI, interactants who spoke to an artiﬁcial agent (the chat bot
Cleverbot) via a text screen were signiﬁcantly less likely to vocalize
other-initiations of repair than those who spoke to the same agent
via a human body interface (i.e., an echoborg). Likewise, in-
teractants made explicitly aware prior to engaging in conversation
with Cleverbot that their interlocutor's wordswould be determined
by an agent were signiﬁcantly less likely to vocalize other-
initiations of repair than those not made explicitly aware of the
source of their interlocutor's communicative agency. Meanwhile,
the likelihood of an interactant producing a self-repair following an
other-initiation uttered by Cleverbot changed neither on the basis
of the interface through which the agent communicated nor on thebasis of the interactant being made aware that their interlocutor's
world were agent-determined. A post-hoc analysis revealed that
the interactants most likely (on average) to utter a subsequent
other-initiation following a non-repair produced by Cleverbot were
those who engaged a human body while not explicitly aware that
their interlocutor's words were agent-determined. Moreover, the
interactants most likely (on average) to depart from a repair
sequence entirely following Cleverbot non-repair were those who
both engaged their interlocutor through a text screen interface and
knew their interlocutor's words to be agent-determined.
These results suggest that when people speak to an artiﬁcial
agent under the same conditions as everyday humanehuman
interaction (i.e., when an agent has a real human body that is
assumed to communicate autonomously), they more persistently
try to establish common ground (i.e., they exert more intersub-
jective effort) relative to conditions wherein knowledge that an
interlocutor's words are determined by an agent is explicit and/or
the interface is nonhuman. This ﬁnding is important because it
points to a potential glass ceiling for artiﬁcial agent participation in
human intersubjectivity. If roboticists someday build a machine
that is indistinguishable from an actual human in terms of
appearance and communication (i.e., if the machine were able to
pass a Total Turing Test; see Harnad, 1991), the mere knowledge of
it being something “artiﬁcial” might suppress the amount of
intersubjective effort people exert when interacting with it.
Surprisingly, the likelihood of an interactant attempting to self-
repair a trouble source in response to an other-initiation was not
affected by the experimental manipulations whereas the rate of
interactant other-initiation was. This could be because other-
initiations of repair are active attempts to manipulate the atten-
tion of an interlocutor toward a trouble source and, therefore, at
some level indicate an implicit supposition that an interlocutor
possesses a capacity for advanced intersubjectivity. A self-repair
attempt, on the other hand, is more of a reﬂexive response that
follows a request to update an interlocutor's meta-perspective; a
person need not presuppose that an interlocutor possesses a ca-
pacity for advanced intersubjectivity in order to produce a suc-
cessful self-repair following other-initiation (in fact, it may even be
that not attempting an appropriate self-repair following other-
initiation, say by departing from the conversational trajectory, is
more unnatural for humans than simply producing a self-repair
attempt). Relative to the performance of a self-repair attempt,
articulating an other-initiation of repair may involve higher-order
mentalizing about the perspectives of an interlocutor, and this
higher-order mentalizing may be more sensitive to changes in how
the interlocutor is represented.
These ﬁndings can be positioned within a broader discussion
that concerns the centrality of intersubjectivity and intersubjective
effort in human life. As argued herein, and has been established in
both the ﬁelds of developmental psychology and communication,
complex intersubjectivity is a co-construction (one interactant
cannot accomplish it alone). Child development, for instance, re-
quires children be brought into advanced intersubjective relations
by-way-of adult scaffolding (Berk & Winsler, 1995; Plumert &
Nichols-Whitehead, 1996), which entails a high level of intersub-
jective effort. Adults scaffold by providing a level of verbal guidance
and support for children's understanding that is just beyond their
actual level of comprehension, thus pulling them into increasingly
complex intersubjective relations (the “zone of proximal develop-
ment”; see Vygotsky, 1978). Equally, achieving common ground in
communicative interaction between adults cannot occur solely
based on the actions or cognitions of one side of the interaction;
rather it is a joint achievement, with each side supporting the other
side in the calibration of perspectives (Rommetveit, 1974; Schegloff,
1992). Rommetveit (1974) axiom that “intersubjectivity has [… ] to
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notion. If humans do not initially assume a highly intersubjective
interlocutor, they will not engage in the complex intersubjective
processes with the interlocutor that are necessary to further elab-
orate the pair's intersubjectivity. Even when misunderstanding
arises, other-initiations of repair reveal an implicit belief that
common ground can be achieved by-way-of an exchange of per-
spectives. On the other hand, abandoning the assumption of
intersubjectivity will block the achievement of common ground
due to fewer attempts at repair.
If human interactants do not ﬁrst expect high-level intersub-
jectivity from artiﬁcial agents, they will not extend such intersub-
jectivity to them, effectively locking them out of the full spectrum
of human intersubjective relations. In order to develop forms of HAI
that reach benchmark intersubjectivity, agents e as with human
infants e will need to be able to learn from the other-initiations of
repair issued by their human interactants. It is easy to imagine how
severely constrained human social relations would become if in-
terlocutors repeatedly failed to signal to each other when some-
thing has caused misunderstanding (complex joint activity would
be impossible). No matter how capable each party to an interaction
is at operating at benchmark intersubjectivity, it takes benchmark
intersubjective efforte a robust exchanging of perspectivese to get
there.
5.1. The echoborg method and analysis of repair activity as a means
of benchmarking intersubjectivity in human-agent dialog
Given the primacy of intersubjectivity in cooperative human
social behavior, it is imperative that evaluative frameworks for HAI
generally, and human-agent dialog speciﬁcally, involve assessing
intersubjectivity against humanehuman interaction benchmarks.
Although various researchers have explicitly called for this
approach (e.g., Cassell & Tartaro, 2007), numerous others have
indirectly called for a focus on intersubjectivity through advocacy
of interactionist HAI methodologies (e.g., Dautenhahn, 2007;
Johnson et al., 2014; Parise, Kiesler, Sproull, & Waters, 1999; Payr,
2001), including but not limited to the analysis of grounding
behavior in human-agent dialog (e.g., Brennan, 1991; Kiesler, 2005;
Lücking & Mehler, 2014; Visser, Traum, DeVault, & op den Akker,
2014) and interaction authenticity (e.g., Feil-Seifer, Skinner, &
Mataric, 2007; Kahn et al., 2007; Turkle, 2007). Indeed, a concern
with intersubjectivity is implicit in many approaches to HAI eval-
uation, such as those that investigate people's emotional responses
to robotic and virtual agents (e.g., Balzarotti, Piccini, Andreoni, &
Ciceri, 2014; Brave, Nass, & Hutchinson, 2005; Prendinger &
Ishizuka, 2005).
The current article is a contribution toward developing meth-
odologies for benchmarking intersubjectivity and intersubjective
effort in HAI. Herein it is demonstrated how the echoborg method
can be used to evaluate human-agent intersubjectivity when the
agent is an artiﬁcial conversational agent. The unique strength of
the echoborg method is that it can involve research participants
communicating with an agentwhile believing that they are speaking
to an autonomous human being. Thus, the echoborg method allows
researchers the ability to investigate HAI intersubjectivity while
preserving the interactant's sense that they are experiencing a fully
humanehuman social psychological context.
5.2. Might intersubjective effort in human-agent dialog increase as
technology improves?
The seeming unwillingness of interactants to exert benchmark
intersubjective effort with a conversational agent in the non-
baseline conditions of the present research may prove to be ahistorical artifact. As more advanced artiﬁcial intelligence develops
and as people are raised in a world in which socially advanced
artiﬁcial agents are ubiquitous, the expectations people will place
on the intersubjective capacities of their machine interlocutorsmay
increase. The study of social psychological phenomena is in many
respects the study of behavioral patterns contingent upon cultural
and historical circumstances (Gergen,1973). Themore that artiﬁcial
agents are able to engage humans in complex intersubjective pro-
cesses, such as repair work, the more humans might be willing to
scaffold their participation in rich intersubjectivity. Indeed, the
ﬁnding that interactants self-repair at relatively consistent rates
irrespective of the interface they engage with or their awareness of
the agency of an interlocutor is evidence that humans readily “step
up” and respond with a repair attempt as needed.
5.3. Limitations
A particular strength of the echoborg method, which itself is
derived from the “cyranoid method” of social interaction (Corti &
Gillespie, 2015b), is that it enables the study of social interactions
that are high in mundane realism (dynamic, unscripted and face-
to-face). The beneﬁts of such realism, however, incur costs in the
form of certain control limitations. For instance, though best efforts
were made to ensure that the speech shadower's body language
was consistent across experimental trials (the shadower was
instructed to try and match their body language to the words they
found themselves articulating), it is all but impossible to
completely eliminate variability in shadower body language from
trial to trial using the echoborg method. Furthermore, the minimal
technological dependency format of inputting interactants' words
into Cleverbot created slightly unnatural delays between interac-
tant utterances and subsequent responses by the agent. Though all
experimental conditions were subject to the same latencies, future
improvements to the echoborg method may mitigate this
limitation.
6. Conclusion
The present research has found that two factors signiﬁcantly
affect the rate at which an interactant will attempt to elicit repairs
of misunderstandings through other-initiation utterances from an
interlocutor that is a conversational agent, namely, (1) the agent's
interface (i.e., its embodied nature - the means by which it com-
municates) and (2) the interactant's awareness that their in-
terlocutor's words are agent-determined. These factors, however,
do not seem to affect the rate at which interactants attempt to self-
repair misunderstandings following other-initiations. Given the
operationalization of intersubjective effort argued for herein (i.e., a
commitment to repair misunderstandings), it seems that people
exert the most intersubjective effort with an agent-interlocutor
when they are unaware that their interlocutor's words are agent-
determined and when the agent interfaces via an actual human
body.
This article contributes a novel methodology (i.e., the echoborg
method) to the study of HAI and demonstrates how it can be used
to compare conditions of HAI that make use of nonhuman in-
terfaces and nonhuman agency-framing to a baseline condition
that approximates the social psychological contextual frame
experienced by people during mundane, face-to-face, in person,
humanehuman interaction. This article's ﬁndings have implica-
tions for the development of autonomous social agents. Most
notably, if agents are to participate fully in the intersubjectiveworld
of humans, not only must they be capable of interacting at bench-
mark intersubjectivity, but human interactants must also be willing
to exert intersubjective effort at a level conducive for the
K. Corti, A. Gillespie / Computers in Human Behavior 58 (2016) 431e442 441achievement of benchmark intersubjectivity (e.g., by uttering
other-initiations of repair whenmisunderstanding arises). Artiﬁcial
agents cannot enter the world of human intersubjectivity without
the support of their human interactants, and this support is
contingent upon interactants' supposition that complex intersub-
jectivity is achievable.References
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